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On the relation between corporate
governance compliance and operating
performance
Heidi Vander Bauwhede*
Abstract— Better corporate performance has been cited as one of the main beneﬁts of adopting good corporate governance
structures within organisations. However, in contrast to theory, a prior European study (Bauer et al., 2004) reports evidence of
a negative relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. This study re-examines this relationship,
and reports evidence of a positive relationship between the extent of compliance with international best practices concerning
board structure and functioning and operating performance when operating performance is measured by the return on assets
(ROA). This result is robust to controlling for the ﬁrms’ compliance with best practices in other governance areas, and holds
for some other governance dimensions, namely disclosure of corporate governance and the range of takeover defences.
Further tests indicate that greater compliance with international best practices concerning board structure and functioning is
signiﬁcantly associated with reporting less income from asset disposals and that studying a performance measure that
includes this item obscures the inherently positive relationship between operating performance and the extent of compliance
with international best practices regarding board structure and functioning. The results provide some support for an often-
cited motivation for the adoption of good governance practices, and provide explicit evidence that the measure of operating
performance is crucial in examining ﬁrm-level operating performance.
Keywords: corporate governance; operating performance
1. Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between
corporate governance compliance and operating
performance for a set of large listed European
companies. My focus is on compliance with
international best practice in corporate governance.
Following Jensen (1993) and prior governance
research, I hypothesise that greater compliance with
international corporate governance best practices
and, more speciﬁcally, best practices concerning the
structure and functioning of the board, is associated
with better operating performance, ceteris paribus.
I investigate the relationship between corporate
governance compliance and operating performance
for a sample of European companies in 2000–2001,
because, during that period, there remained consid-
erable variation in corporate governance practices
(see Wójcik, 2006; Bauer et al., 2008), notwith-
standing that there were pressures from, for
example, institutional investors or cross-listings to
comply with international corporate governance
best practices and that in some countries local codes
were, de facto, mandatory.1,2
The study focuses on operating performance, and
not stock market performance, in order to investi-
gate further the result of a prior European study
(Bauer et al., 2004) on the relation between
compliance with best practices concerning corpor-
ate governance and operating performance which
seems to conﬂict with both theory as well as prior
American results. More speciﬁcally, Bauer et al.
(2004) report evidence of a negative relationship
between ratings on the extent of compliance with
international best practices and ﬁrm operating
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1 I refer to a study commissioned by the European commis-
sion (Weil et al., 2002) and to the website of the European
Corporate Governance Institute (http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
all_codes.php) for an overview of the corporate governance
codes in the European Union. International governance codes
are, for example, those established by the International
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), and the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
2 Some countries (such as the UK and Italy) required
companies to disclose whether they complied with a (national)
corporate governance code under a ‘comply or explain’
approach. This approach requires ﬁrms to disclose whether
(and to what extent) they comply with a particular corporate
governance code and, if they do not (fully) comply, to explain
why they do not comply.
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performance, whereas theory (Jensen, 1993), pre-
dicts a positive relationship3 and a prior American
study (Larcker et al., 2005) ﬁnds some (albeit weak)
evidence of a positive relationship. I primarily focus
on board structure and functioning, and not on other
dimensions of corporate governance (such as, for
example, rights and duties of shareholders and
range of takeover defences), because it is especially
the structure and functioning of the board that can
directly affect the operating efﬁciency and operat-
ing performance of a company. However, for
completeness, I also perform and report the results
of some additional analyses on the relation between
other dimensions of corporate governance and ﬁrm
operating performance.
I use a sample of European listed companies for
which a private rating agency issues a ﬁrm-level
rating of the extent of compliance with inter-
national best practices concerning board structure
and functioning. Results of univariate and multi-
variate tests indicate that the one-year ahead return
on assets (ROA) increases in the extent of
compliance with international best practices con-
cerning board structure and functioning. Tests
show that the results are not affected by the
potential endogeneity of the extent of governance
compliance. In addition, the results are robust to
controlling for the ﬁrms’ compliance with best
practices in other governance areas, such as rights
and duties of shareholders and range of takeover
defences, and to controlling for country-level
performance. Moreover, I also ﬁnd a positive
relation between the extent of compliance with
recommendations in some other governance
dimensions, more speciﬁcally disclosure on cor-
porate governance and range of takeover defences,
and ﬁrm operating performance.
Further, additional analyses indicate that greater
compliance with international best practices con-
cerning board structure and functioning is signiﬁ-
cantly associated with reporting less income from
asset disposals and that studying a performance
measure that includes the income from asset
disposals, such as the return on equity (ROE) or
net proﬁt margin (NPM) used by Bauer et al.
(2004), instead of a performance measure which is
not impacted by the income from asset disposals,
such as the return on assets (ROA), obscures the
inherently positive relationship between operating
performance and the extent of compliance with
international best practices regarding board struc-
ture and functioning.
This study contributes to the literature on the
relation between corporate governance and corpor-
ate performance. A ﬁrst contribution is that the
study reports a positive relation between the extent
of compliance with international best practices on
various governance dimensions (board structure
and functioning, disclosure on corporate govern-
ance) and the operating performance of European
companies. A second contribution is that this study
reports evidence which indicates that the unex-
pected negative relationship between corporate
governance compliance and operating performance
as reported by Bauer et al. (2004)4 is due to poorly-
governed companies using the available discretion
over the timing of asset sales to cover up their
inherently lower operating performance. The key
difference between this study and that of Bauer et al.
(2004) is that the return on assets is introduced as
the preferred measure of operating performance
because the income measure used in computing the
return on assets, i.e. operating income, is less
inﬂuenced by discretionary items than the income
measure used to compute the return on equity or net
proﬁt margin, i.e. income before extraordinary
items. The return on equity and net proﬁt margin
are the performance measures used by Bauer et al.
(2004).
The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. The next section develops the main
research hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample
and data. Section 4 presents the empirical model.
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
The various corporate governance codes that have
been issued since the late 1990s often refer to better
performance as one of the key beneﬁts of adopting
their corporate governance recommendations. This
performance can be understood as better market
performance (i.e. higher stock returns or ﬁrm
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3 Bauer et al. (2004) ﬁnd indications of a positive relationship
between governance ratings, and stock returns and ﬁrm value,
respectively.
4 Examples of other studies that have examined the relation
between governance and performance using samples from other
countries (for example, the US, Australia, and various Asian and
some (individual) European countries), and using and focusing
on a variety of governance attributes and performance measures,
are: Larcker et al. (2006), Black et al. (2006), Brown and Caylor
(2006a), Brown and Caylor (2006b), Durnev and Kim (2005),
Larcker et al. (2005), Alves and Mendes (2004), Bebchuk et al.
(2004), Klapper and Love (2004), Drobetz et al. (2004), Kiel
and Nicholson (2003), Bhagat and Black (2002), Yermack
(1996), and Klein (1998).
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value)5 or as better operating performance. The
expected relationship between compliance with
corporate governance recommendations and oper-
ating performance is based on the argument that
ﬁrms with a better governance structure operate
more efﬁciently which increases their operating
performance (see, for example, Jensen, 1993).
However, results of previous studies on the relation
between governance and operating performance are
mixed. Larcker et al. (2005), for example, ﬁnd some
evidence of a positive relationship between an
overall governance metric (The Corporate Library
Board Effectiveness Rating) and the one-year ahead
ROA for a set of large listed American companies.
By contrast, Bauer et al. (2004) ﬁnd a negative
relationship between an overall governance score
and operating performance for large European
companies.
As with any governance study, a crucial element
in examining the relationship between governance
and performance is how one deﬁnes and measures
‘better governance’. In this study, I use a rating,
issued by a private rating agency (Deminor rating),6
that assesses the extent to which large listed
European ﬁrms comply with international best
practices concerning corporate governance and,
more speciﬁcally, the extent to which ﬁrms comply
with international best practices concerning board
structure and functioning.7 Higher compliance is
implicitly assumed to be better governance.
However, this is not necessarily true. A ﬁrst reason
is that European companies may have adopted
governance mechanisms and practices that differ
from the internationally accepted best practices, but
are better tailored to the speciﬁc context in which
they operate. However, it is probably also true that
there is less need for governance practices tailored
to local contexts for the largest companies in
Europe, which operate globally instead of locally.
Whether large listed European companies beneﬁt
from compliance with international best practices,
and then speciﬁcally in terms of higher operating
performance, is ultimately an empirical question.
Another reason why higher compliance is not
necessarily better governance is that the best
practices identiﬁed by Deminor are not always
unequivocally related to better governance. For
example, evidence on whether CEO duality is bad
governance and board diversity is good governance,
is mixed (see, for example, Sonnenfeld, 2004;
Massa and Simonov, 2007).8 In order to reﬁne the
analysis I focus on the dimension of corporate
governance which is particularly likely to directly
inﬂuence operating efﬁciency and operating per-
formance, i.e. the structure and functioning of the
board of directors.9 As Jensen (1993: 862–863) puts
it, ‘The board, as the apex of the internal control
system, has the ﬁnal responsibility for the function-
ing of the ﬁrm. Most importantly, it sets the rules of
the game for the CEO. The job of the board is to
hire, ﬁre, and compensate the CEO, and to provide
high-level counsel’ and ‘ . . . the very purpose of the
internal control mechanism is to provide an early
warning system to put the organisation back on
track before difﬁculties reach a crisis stage.’ Jensen
(1993) then also attributes the weak corporate
performance from the early 1990s to problems with
the internal control activity (Jensen, 1993: 352) in
the 1980s, which, in turn, stemmed from problems
with the board of directors (Jensen, 1993: 862).
The major threat to a well-functioning board, and
strong operating performance, is that the board is
dominated by managers (especially in Anglo-Saxon
countries) or majority shareholders (especially in
continental European countries) who act in their
own interest (instead of in the interest of all
stakeholders), and cover up any underperformance
by earnings management or manipulation to
appease (minority) shareholders. Jensen (1993:
869) then also recognises that characteristics such
as, for example, high-equity ownership by man-
agers and board members, a small board, not many
insiders on the board, and a CEO which is not the
chairman of the board, are key elements of a well-
functioning governance system, which limits self-
interested behaviour by managers, uncovers bad
performance in time and takes the necessary actions
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5 Examples of studies that have examined aspects of corpor-
ate governance and market performance in an American setting
are Yermack (1996), Bhagat and Black (2002), Gompers et al.
(2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2004). Beiner et al. (2006), Alves
and Mendes (2004), Drobetz et al. (2004) and Kiel and
Nicholson (2003) are examples of governance-market perform-
ance studies using samples of Swiss, Portuguese, German and
Australian companies, respectively.
6 In Section 3, I provide more detail on the rating.
7Most governance studies use either a single indicator of
governance, or an ‘arbitrary’ index. Larcker et al. (2006) argue
that measurement error in these governance metrics may be
partly responsible for the mixed results on the association
between the typical measures of corporate governance and
accounting and economic outcomes. Nevertheless, I prefer to
use the ratings issued by an independent rating agency as
measures of governance compliance since these are publicly
available and easily accessible for market participants. The aim
of the study is to see whether these publicly available measures
of the extent of compliance with international best practices are
related to future operating performance and can as such signal
future operating performance to market participants, who can, in
turn, use this information for decision making.
8 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this observation.
9 For completeness, I later expand the analyses to governance
dimensions other than board structure and functioning. The
results are reported in Section 5.4.
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to ‘put the organisation back on track’ (Jensen,
1993: 863). These key elements of a well-function-
ing board mentioned by Jensen (1993) are all
covered by the international best practices concern-
ing board structure and functioning. Therefore, I
expect that higher compliance with international
best practices concerning board structure and
functioning is related to better operating perform-
ance.
Although greater compliance with international
best practices concerning rights and duties of
shareholders and range of takeover defences may
increase the pressure by investors and themarket for
corporate control on companies to performwell, it is
less straightforward that this greater compliance
with international best practices concerning rights
and duties of shareholders and range of takeover
defences is per se related to better underlying
operating performance, for in the absence of a well-
functioning board, managers and majority share-
holders could still act in their own self-interest,
underperform, and cover up weak performance by
earnings management or manipulation.10,11 This
leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: A company’s operating performance increases
in the extent of compliance with international
best practices concerning board structure and
functioning, ceteris paribus.
3. Sample and data
This study uses ratings of compliance with inter-
national best practices regarding board structure and
functioning which are supplied by a private rating
agency, Deminor Rating. Deminor Rating (a sub-
sidiary of Deminor International) releases, since
March 2001, corporate governance ratings on the
companies of the FTSE Eurotop 300 index.12,13 The
ratings are based on over 300 corporate governance
indicators, which were identiﬁed after consulting
institutional investors. The indicators can be div-
ided into four categories: rights and duties of
shareholders, range of takeover defences, disclosure
on corporate governance and board structure and
functioning. Deminor Rating issues a rating of each
one of the four categories. This study focuses on the
rating regarding board structure and functioning.
This rating covers indicators on the election of
members of the company’s bodies, composition of
the board, functioning of the board, remuneration of
the company’s bodies and committees of the board.
Ratings are assigned by senior analysts from the
different European ofﬁces of Deminor after all the
most recent publicly available information on a
particular company (i.e. not only ﬁnancial reports,
but also articles of association, agendas, resolutions
and minutes of ordinary and extra-ordinary general
meetings, investor’s handbooks and newsletters,
internet-sites and all other publicly available infor-
mation) has been benchmarked against the best
practice found in internationally accepted stand-
ards. Those internationally accepted standards are
established by, for example, the International
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). A rating is measured on a
scale of 5 to 1, with 5 representing the best practice
(Deminor Rating, 2001: 9–10).
The sample studied in this paper consists of all
companies from the FTSE Eurotop 300 for which
there is a Deminor rating of board structure and
functioning for the year 2000 and/ or 2001, as well
as complete information on the other variables in
the model.14 I exclude ﬁnancial companies (FTSE
industry sector code 80) because their ﬁnancial
structure is distinct from other companies and they
are often subject to special rules and recommenda-
tions. I delete observations with extreme observa-
tions (i.e. values outside the 5th and 95th percentile)
for the ratios in the model, namely leverage and the
three measures of operating performance (i.e. ROA,
ROE and NPM), for ratios easily take on extreme
values. The ﬁnal sample exists of 201 ﬁrm-year
observations (from 118 different companies).
Table 1, Panels A and B give a breakdown of the
observations by industry sector and by country,
respectively.
I obtain ﬁnancial statement data from
Worldscope.
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10 De Angelo (1988), for example, reports that, during an
election campaign, managers exercise accounting discretion to
portray a favourable earnings picture to voters.
11 As concerns disclosure on corporate governance, it is
straightforward that mere disclosure per se cannot improve the
operating performance of a company. However, the level of
disclosure is highly positively correlated with the quality of the
structure and the functioning of the board: companies with well-
structured and -functioning boards have no problem in disclos-
ing this information, while companies with badly-structured and
–functioning boards are less transparent about this. A positive
association between high disclosure and good operating
performance is then probably also due to a well-structured and
well-functioning board than to the level of disclosure per se.
12 On 25 May 2005, Deminor announced that it had sold its
corporate governance unit Deminor Rating to Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS).
13 Some other studies that have used Deminor data are Bauer
et al. (2008), Bauer et al. (2006), Wόjcik (2006), Wόjcik et al.
(2005), and Bauer et al. (2004).
14 The item that is most frequently missing is the Deminor
governance rating. This rating is missing because not all FTSE
Eurotop 300 ﬁrms are followed by Deminor.
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Table 1
Sample description
Panel A: Breakdown of sample by industry#
Industry code Industry description Number of ﬁrms % Number of ﬁrm-years %
4 Mining 2 1.69 3 1.49
7 Oil & Gas 6 5.08 10 4.98
11 Chemicals 9 7.63 15 7.46
13 Construction & Building Materials 6 5.08 11 5.47
15 Forestry & Paper 1 0.85 2 1.00
21 Aerospace 3 2.54 5 2.49
24 Diversiﬁed Industrials 3 2.54 4 1.99
25 Electronic & Equipment 7 5.93 12 5.97
26 Engineering and Machinery 7 5.93 12 5.97
31 Automobiles 8 6.78 16 7.96
34 Household Goods & Textiles 4 3.39 8 3.98
41 Beverages 2 1.69 4 1.99
43 Food Producers & Processors 4 3.39 7 3.48
44 Health 1 0.85 1 0.50
47 Personal Care & Household Products 2 1.69 3 1.49
48 Pharmaceuticals 4 3.39 8 3.98
49 Tobacco 2 1.69 4 1.99
52 General Retailers 7 5.93 11 5.48
53 Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels 2 1.69 3 1.49
54 Media & Photography 9 7.63 15 7.46
58 Support Services 3 2.54 5 2.49
59 Transport 1 0.85 1 0.50
63 Food & Drug Retailers 4 3.39 8 3.98
67 Telecommunication Services 6 5.08 8 3.98
72 Electricity 8 6.78 14 6.97
73 Gas Distribution 2 1.69 4 1.99
78 Water 1 0.85 1 0.50
93 Information Technology Hardware 2 1.69 3 1.49
97 Software & Computer Services 2 1.69 3 1.49
Total 118 100 201 100
# Following the FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System.
Panel B: Breakdown of sample by country##
Country Number of ﬁrms % Number of ﬁrm-years %
Belgium 3 2.54 6 2.99
France 25 21.19 49 24.38
Italy 6 5.08 10 4.98
The Netherlands 8 6.78 13 6.47
Portugal 1 0.85 1 0.50
Spain 7 5.93 13 6.47
Switzerland 7 5.93 13 6.47
Germany 12 10.17 21 10.45
Denmark 2 1.69 3 1.49
Norway 1 0.85 2 1.00
Sweden 8 6.78 12 5.97
Finland 1 0.85 2 1.00
Ireland 1 0.85 2 1.00
UK 36 30.51 54 26.87
Total 118 100 201 100
## All but two countries in the sample (Switzerland and Norway) are member of the European Union. All
other countries, but the UK, Denmark and Sweden are part of the Eurozone or EMU (i.e. Europe’s European
and Monetary Union).
Vol. 39, No. 5. 2009 501
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4. Research design and model speciﬁcation
I test the relationship between the extent of
compliance with international best practices con-
cerning corporate governance, and more speciﬁc-
ally board structure and functioning, and the
operating performance of large listed European
companies by estimating the following operating
performance model:
Performanceit ¼ b0 þ b1CG COMPit þ b2LEVit
þ b3LNTAit þ b4Y2001it þ b5Xit
þ eit ð1Þ
where:
Performanceit = ROA, where: ROA is one-year
ahead return on assets for ﬁrm i in
year t;
CG_COMPLit = a rating proxying for the extent of
compliance with international
best practices regarding board
structure and functioning for
ﬁrm i in year t;
LEVit = leverage, as measured by the sum
of short-term and long-term debt
divided by total assets, for ﬁrm i in
year t;
LNTAit = the natural logarithm of total
assets for ﬁrm i in year t;15,16
Y2001it = indicator variable which takes one
if the observation is from 2001,
and zero if the observation is from
2000;
Xit = a vector of industry dummies, i.e.
indicator variables for the (two-
digit) industry codes of the FTSE
Global Classiﬁcation system.
I measure the dependent variable in the operating
performance model, i.e. one-year ahead ﬁrm-level
operating performance, by the one-year ahead
ROA. I use the one-year ahead, instead of the
contemporaneous, ROA to make sure that the
governance systems described by the ratings are
in place and operational at the moment that I start
measuring operating performance. Consistent with
prior studies (e.g. Larcker et al., 2006), ROA is
measured as operating income divided by average
total assets.17 For comparison, I also perform
analyses in which I replace the one-year ahead
ROAwith the one-year ahead ROE and the one-year
ahead NPM, because the ROE and the NPM were
used as performance measures in the study by Bauer
et al. (2004). The ROE is measured as earnings
before extraordinary items dividend by the average
book value of stockholders’ equity, and net proﬁt
margin is the ratio of earnings before extraordinary
items divided by sales (see, for example, Gompers
et al., 2003). As argued by Core et al. (2006) and
Barber and Lyon (1996), the ROA is clearly the
preferred measure of operating performance
because it is less affected by discretionary items
than the ROE and the NPM. This implies that I
expect a stronger relationship between the extent of
compliance with international best practices con-
cerning board structure and functioning and the
one-year ahead ROA, than between the extent of
compliance and the one-year ahead ROE or the one-
year ahead NPM. I will further refer to the three
models as the ROA model, the ROE model and the
NPM model.
The test variable is a measure of the level of
compliance with international best practices con-
cerning corporate governance, and more speciﬁc-
ally best practices concerning board structure and
functioning (CG_COMPL). CG_COMPL is prox-
ied by Deminor’s rating of board structure and
functioning. The rating takes a value from 1 to 5
with 5 indicating the highest compliance with
international best practice. A positive sign on
CG_COMPL indicates that greater compliance
with best practices concerning board structure and
functioning is related to better operating perform-
ance, and is consistent with the hypothesis. I further
include in the regression leverage (LEV), computed
as the sum of short-term and long-term debt over
total assets, to control for the well-known impact of
leverage on ROE, the natural logarithm of total
assets (LNTA) as a measure of ﬁrm size, a year
dummy (Y2001) to control for the impact of the
general macro-economic context on individual ﬁrm
performance, and a vector of industry dummies.
5. Descriptive statistics and results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics for
the dependent and independent variables of the
operating performance model. Table 2, Panel A,
shows that the mean one-year ahead ROA is about
6.6% (median 6.4%). The mean one-year ahead
ROE is higher, and about 7.3% (median 10.2%).
The mean one-year ahead NPM amounts to 2.9%
(median 3.7%). Mean and median leverage is about
28%.
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15 Total assets are measured in thousands of Euros. Values
initially stated in a local currency are converted to Euros by
using the exchange rate at the balance sheet date.
16 I use the natural logarithm because I do not expect a linear
relationship between operating performance and ﬁrm size.
17 The average is computed as the sum of the value at the
beginning of the accounting period and the value at the end of
the accounting period, divided by two.
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Table 2, Panel B, presents the Pearson correlation
coefﬁcients between the dependent and independ-
ent variables of the operating performance model.
The dependent variables, one-year ahead ROA,
one-year ahead ROE and one-year ahead NPM are
all positively correlated with CG_COMPL.
However, only the correlation of ROA and
CG_COMPL is signiﬁcant. The highest absolute
value of the correlations among the independent
variables is 0.21, which indicates that the regression
results are not affected by multicollinearity.
5.2. Regression results
I estimate the performance model using ordinary
least squares (OLS). A concern in testing the
relation between the extent of compliance with
international best practices concerning corporate
governance, and more speciﬁcally board structure
and functioning, and the operating performance of
large listed European companies is that ﬁrms with
good prospects may self-select into the group with
stronger governance structures, while ﬁrms with
poor prospects may self-select into the group with
weaker governance structures. If this is indeed true,
the OLS parameter estimates are inconsistent.
However, the results of a Hausman-like test for
endogeneity as described in Gujarati (2003: 713)
show that CG_COMPL is not endogenous with
respect to any of the dependent variables (p on the
ﬁtted value of CG_COMPL > 0.10, two-sided).
For the endogeneity test, I used the following ﬁrst
stage model (governance compliance model),
which is based on prior empirical disclosure and
governance studies (see, for example, Pincus et al.,
1989 and Willekens et al., 2004):
CG COMPLit ¼ g0 þ g1FFLOATit þ g2LEVit
þ g3ROACit þ g4LNTAit
þ g5Yit þ g6Zit þ mit; ð2Þ
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 05 ABR Bauwhede.3d Page 503 of 516
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations#
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max.
ROA 201 0.0658 0.0482 –0.0352 0.0314 0.0635 0.0946 0.1966
ROE 201 0.0729 0.1507 –0.5838 0.0433 0.1019 0.1588 0.3015
NPM 201 0.0289 0.0769 –0.4580 0.0110 0.0365 0.0684 0.1626
LEV 201 0.2773 0.1135 0.0470 0.1868 0.2794 0.3642 0.4955
LNTA 201 16.5757 1.0492 13.7591 15.8908 16.3970 17.2708 19.1507
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefﬁcients
ROA ROE NPM CG_COMPL LEV LNTA
ROA 1.0000
ROE 0.5095
NPM 0.5224 0.8328
CG_COMPL 0.1823 0.0271 0.0190
LEV –0.1993 –0.1724 –0.1640 –0.0092 1.0000
LNTA –0.4028 –0.1337 –0.2297 –0.0273 0.2066 1.0000
# Variable deﬁnitions:
ROA = one-year ahead return on assets for ﬁrm i in year t, and is measured as operating
income divided by average total assets,
ROE = one-year ahead return on equity for ﬁrm i in year t, and is measured as earnings
before extraordinary items divided by the average book value of stockholders’
equity,
NPM = one-year ahead net proﬁt margin for ﬁrm i in year t, and is measured as earnings
before extraordinary items divided by sales revenues
LEV = ratio of short-term debt plus long-term debt over total assets for ﬁrm i in year t
LNTA = natural logarithm of total assets for ﬁrm i in year t
CG_COMPL = score from 1 to 5 with higher scores indicating greater compliance of ﬁrm i in year t
with international best practice concerning board structure and functioning
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where: FFLOATit= the free ﬂoat of ﬁrm i in year t;
ROA_Cit = the contemporaneous return on assets
for ﬁrm i in year t; Yit = a vector of country
dummies, i.e. indicator variables for the country of
domicile of the ﬁrms in the sample; Zit = a vector of
other exogenous variables from the operating
performance model (i.e. second stage regression).
The other variables are as deﬁned in Equation (1).
Re-performing the endogeneity tests (1) deleting
the contemporaneous return on assets in the ﬁrst
stage regression, or (2) replacing the contemporan-
eous return on assets with the past return on assets in
the ﬁrst stage regression conﬁrm that CG_COMPL
is not endogenous with respect to any of the
dependent variables. This contrasts with results in
Renders and Gaeremynck (2006), and is most likely
due to differences in research design. More specif-
ically, to be sure that the corporate governance
systems are in place and operational at the moment
that I start measuring operating performance, I use
one-year ahead operating performance measures
(instead of contemporaneous operating perform-
ance measures).
As there are two years of data, there are repeated
observations on some companies. Although obser-
vations are still independent across ﬁrms, they are
no longer independent within ﬁrms. Therefore, the
t-values are adjusted to control for within-company
dependence by using clustered robust standard
errors.18
Table 3 reports the results of the OLS regression
analyses. Columns 3, 5, and 7 show the results of
models that use the one-year ahead ROA, the one-
year ahead ROE and the one-year ahead NPM as the
dependent variable, respectively. Table 3 shows that
the performance models have explanatory power
(adjusted R2 of 49.30%, 23.41% and 22.11%,
respectively). The coefﬁcient on CG_COMPL is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level (one-sided)
in the ROA model. The magnitude of the
CG_COMPL coefﬁcient (0.0054) suggests a dif-
ference of 2.16% in the realised one-year ahead
ROA between ﬁrms with the lowest and the highest
rating of CG_COMPL (i.e. 4*0.54%). This result
supports the hypothesis that operating performance
is higher for ﬁrms that comply to a greater extent
with international best practices concerning board
structure and functioning. Consistent with the
argument that the one-year ahead ROA is the
preferred measure of operating performance, the
coefﬁcient on CG_COMPL is not signiﬁcant for the
ROE and NPM models.
Table 3 further shows that the one-year ahead
ROA and one-year ahead NPM decrease in size
(LNTA). In addition, the industry dummies (not
reported) are signiﬁcant predictors of all three
performance measures.19
5.3. Additional analyses
Other measures of operating performance
To conﬁrm the evidence from the ROA model on
the positive and signiﬁcant relation between the
extent of compliance with international best prac-
tices concerning board structure and functioning
and operating performance, I replace the one-year
ahead ROA in the operating performance model
with two alternative measures of operating per-
formance, i.e. the one-year ahead return on cash-
adjusted assets and the one-year ahead return on
sales (ROS) (see Barber and Lyon, 1996). The
return on cash-adjusted assets is measured by
dividing operating income by the average cash-
adjusted assets, i.e. total assets minus cash and cash
equivalents. The ROS is operating income divided
by sales. Table 4 reports the results of the operating
performance regressions when using these alterna-
tive operating performance measures. Table 4 also
reports the results of the regression when using the
one-year ahead ROA as the dependent variable for
comparison. Table 4 shows that the results on the
test variable (CG_COMPL) when using the alter-
native operating performance measures are qualita-
tively similar to the result when using the one-year
ahead ROA.
Examining the difference in results between
performance measures
The results in Tables 3 and 4 report a signiﬁcantly
positive relationship between the extent of compli-
ance with international best practices concerning
board structure and functioning (CG_COMPL) and
performance for some performance measures
(i.e. the one-year ahead ROA, the one-year ahead
return on cash-adjusted assets and the one-year
ahead ROS, all measures which use operating
income in the numerator), but not for other
performance measures (i.e. the one-year ahead
ROE) and one-year ahead NPM, two measures
which use income before extraordinary items in the
numerator). Especially the difference in results
when using the ROS and the NPM is striking, since
the only difference between these two measures is
the numerator. (The ROS uses operating income
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 05 ABR Bauwhede.3d Page 504 of 516
18 The results are qualitatively similar when not adjusting for
within company dependence.
19 Deleting the industry dummies from industries with only
one observation (i.e. health, transport, and water) or all industry
dummies does not change the results on the test variable.
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whereas the NPM uses earnings before extraordin-
ary items in the numerator. Both measures have
sales revenues in the denominator.) This suggests
that something that causes the difference between
operating income and earnings before extraordinary
items can explain why there is a signiﬁcant
relationship between performance and the extent
of compliance with international best practices
concerning board structure and functioning when
using some performance measures, but not when
using other performance measures. Some of the
difference between operating income and earnings
before extraordinary items is in interest payment
and taxes. Moreover, given the Worldscope data
deﬁnitions of operating income and earnings before
extraordinary items, some of the difference between
the two income measures stems from allocations to
and/or from reserves, from minority interests, from
equity in earnings,20 and from other non-operating
income and expenses. These other non-operating
income and expenses include items such as: non-
operating interest income, non-operating dividend
income, and the gain/ loss on disposal of assets, i.e.
the income from asset disposals.
To further explore what causes the difference in
the relationship between corporate governance
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Table 3
Regression results#
ROA ROE NPM
Variable Pred. sign Coef. estimate Pred. sign Coef. estimate Pred. sign Coef. estimate
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Intercept ? 0.4252*** ? 0.4511* ? 0.4142***
(7.14) (1.70) (2.87)
CG_COMPL + 0.0054*** + –0.0034 + –0.0023
(2.38) (–0.39) (–0.61)
LEV ? –0.0291 + –0.1930 ? –0.0702
(–0.90) (–1.32) (–1.2)
LNTA – –0.0197*** ? –0.0144 ? –0.0179**
(–5.33) (–0.88) (–2.04)
Y2001 ? –0.0060* ? –0.0258 ? –0.0106
(–1.82) (–1.59) (–1.10)
Industry dummies ? Included ? Included ? Included
Adj. R-squared 49.30% 23.41% 22.11%
N 201 201 201
Evidence of endogeneity No No No
# This table reports the results of the OLS estimation of the following regression model:
Performanceit ¼ b0 þ b1CGCOMPLit þ b2LEVit þ b3LNTAit þ b4Y2001it þ b5Xit þ eit
Where: Performanceit = ROA, ROE or NPM. ROA = one-year ahead return on assets for ﬁrm i in year t,
and is measured as operating income divided by average total assets; ROE = one-year ahead return on
equity for ﬁrm i in year t, and is measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by the average
book value of stockholders’ equity; NPM = one-year ahead net proﬁt margin for ﬁrm i in year t, and is
measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by sales revenues; CG_COMPLit = score from 1 to
5 with higher scores indicating greater compliance of ﬁrm i in year t with international best practice
concerning board structure and functioning; LEVit = ratio of short-term debt plus long-term debt over total
assets for ﬁrm i in year t; LNTAit = natural logarithm of total assets for ﬁrm i in year t; Y2001it = year
dummy, =1 when an observation is from 2001, zero otherwise; Xit = a vector of industry dummies based on
the FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System two-digit code for the industry sector.
*,** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively and is based on a one-
tailed test if the sign of the coefﬁcient is in the predicted direction, and is based on a two-tailed test
otherwise. T-values are adjusted for within-company dependence by using clustered robust standard errors.
Results on the two-digit industry dummies are not reported for parsimony.
20 This represents the ‘pretax portion of the earnings or losses
of a subsidiary whose ﬁnancial accounts are not consolidated
with the controlling company’s accounts’ (see Thomson
Financial, 2003).
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compliance (CG_COMPL) and performance when
using the NPM instead of the ROS as the measure of
performance, I compute the pairwise correlations
between each one of the identiﬁed items which
make up the difference between operating income
and earnings before extraordinary income (scaled
by sales) and the measure of corporate governance
compliance (CG_COMPL).21 I further adjust oper-
ating income for each one of the items at a time and
regress each one of the new income measures
(scaled by sales) on the measure of corporate
governance compliance (CG_COMPL) and the
control variables, i.e. I replace the dependent
variable in the performance model with a new
performance measure.
The results of these detailed analyses show that
income from asset disposals22 (scaled by sales) is
signiﬁcantly negatively related to the extent of
corporate governance compliance (CG_COMPL)
(correlation coefﬁcient =0.1869, p-value< 0.01),
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Table 4
Regression results using alternative operating performance measures#
ROA
Return on
cash-adj. assets Return on sales
Variable Pred. sign Coef. estimate Pred. sign Coef. estimate Pred. sign Coef. estimate
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Intercept ? 0.4252*** ? 0.4722*** ? 0.4829***
(7.14) (7.11) (4.55)
CG_COMPL + 0.0054*** + 0.0050** + 0.0062**
(2.38) (2.02) (2.09)
LEV ? –0.0291 ? –0.0399 ? 0.0901*
(–0.90) (–1.15) (1.93)
LNTA – –0.0197*** –
–
0.0220*** ? –0.0212***
(–5.33) (–5.42) (–3.57)
Y2001 ? –0.0060* ? –0.0056 ? –0.0048
(–1.82) (–1.57) (–1.09)
Industry dummies ? Included ? Included ? Included
Adj. R-squared 49.30% 50.05% 47.90%
N 201 201 201
# This table reports the results of the OLS estimation of the following regression model:
Performanceit ¼ b0 þ b1CGCOMPLit þ b2LEVit þ b3LNTAit þ b4Y2001it þ b5Xit þ eit
Where: Performanceit = ROA, Return on cash-adjusted assets or Return on sales. ROA = one-year ahead
return on assets for ﬁrm i in year t, and is measured as operating income divided by average total assets;
Return on cash-adjusted assets = one-year ahead return on cash-adjusted assets for ﬁrm i in year t, and is
measured as operating income divided by average (total assets minus cash and cash equivalents); Return on
sales = one-year ahead return on sales for ﬁrm i in year t, and is measured as operating income divided by
sales revenues; CG_COMPLit = score from 1 to 5 with higher scores indicating greater compliance of ﬁrm i
in year t with international best practice concerning board structure and functioning; LEVit = ratio of short-
term debt plus long-term debt over total assets for ﬁrm i in year t; LNTAit = natural logarithm of total assets
for ﬁrm i in year t; Y2001it = year dummy, =1 when an observation is from 2001, zero otherwise; Xit = a
vector of industry dummies based on the FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System two-digit code for the industry
sector.
*,** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively and is based on a one-
tailed test if the sign of the coefﬁcient is in the predicted direction, and is based on a two-tailed test
otherwise. T-values are adjusted for within-company dependence by using clustered robust standard errors.
Results on the two-digit industry dummies are not reported for parsimony.
21 As the performance measures used in the primary analyses,
these items and the newly computed performance measures are
on a one-year ahead basis.
22 The sample companies report a gain on disposal of assets in
64% of the ﬁrm-years, a loss on disposal of assets in 22% of the
ﬁrm-years, and neither a gain nor a loss on disposal of assets in
14% of the ﬁrm-years.
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and that, once operating income is adjusted for the
income from asset disposals and this measure scaled
by sales is used as the measure of performance
(i.e. the ‘new ROS’), the signiﬁcant relationship
between performance and corporate governance
compliance (CG_COMPL), established when using
the original ROS as the measure of performance,
disappears. The coefﬁcient is 0.0025, p-value >
0.10, one-sided, when using the new ROS, com-
pared to a coefﬁcient = 0.0062, p-value< 0.05, one-
sided, when using the original ROS (see Table 4).
Moreover, although some other items which
make up the difference between operating income
and earnings before extraordinary items are also
negatively related to corporate governance com-
pliance, none of the adjustments to operating
income for these items makes the relationship
between performance and the corporate govern-
ance compliance insigniﬁcant like the adjustment
for the income from asset disposals does. Taken
together, the results of the additional analyses
suggest that the income from asset disposals plays
a major role in the disappearance of the signiﬁcant
relationship between performance and corporate
governance compliance, once the NPM is used
instead of the ROS as the measure of perform-
ance.
Management has some discretion over the timing
of asset sales and previous studies (Herrmann et al.,
2003; Bartov, 1993) have shown that the timing of
assets sales is used as an instrument to manage
earnings. More speciﬁcally Bartov (1993) ﬁnds that
companies use the timing of asset sales to smooth
income, i.e. report a higher (lower) income from
asset sales in years in which (pre-managed) income
is lower (higher) compared to the previous year.
Further analyses23 indicate that this study’s sample
companies present similar behaviour. Moreover, the
extent of corporate governance compliance
(CG_COMPL) is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated
with the occurrence of a lower (pre-managed)
income compared to the previous year (correla-
tion coefﬁcient = 0.2076, p-value <0.01). That
is, poorly governed companies underperform
more often than well-governed companies.
Consequently, one expects that poorly governed
companies record a higher income from asset
disposals than well-governed companies. The sig-
niﬁcantly negative correlation between the income
from asset disposals (scaled by sales) and the
extent of corporate governance compliance
(CG_COMPL) is consistent with this expectation.
In sum, the results indicate that companies which
comply less with international best practices con-
cerning board structure and functioning try to make
up their inherently lower performance by reporting
a higher income from asset disposals (scaled by
sales). The net result of this earnings management
behaviour is that, once the income from asset
disposals is included in the numerator of the
performance measure, one no longer observes a
signiﬁcant relationship between operating perform-
ance and the extent to which ﬁrms comply with
international best practices concerning corporate
governance.
To further examine whether the income from
asset disposals can help explain that there is a
signiﬁcant relationship between performance and
the extent of compliance with international best
practices concerning board structure and function-
ing when using some performance measures but not
others, I replace in the performance model the
original ROA, which uses operating income in the
numerator, by a new ROA measure which uses
operating income adjusted for the income from
asset disposals in the numerator. The result of
replacing the original ROA with this new ROA
measure is that the coefﬁcient on CG_COMPL
becomes insigniﬁcant. The coefﬁcient is 0.0027, p-
value> 0.15, one-sided, when using the new ROA,
compared to a coefﬁcient = 0.0054, p-value <0.01,
one-sided, when using the original ROA (see
Table 3). This conﬁrms the idea that the income
from asset disposals plays a major role in explaining
the differences in the signiﬁcance of the relationship
between operating performance and the extent of
compliance with international best practices con-
cerning board structure and functioning when using
other performance measures.
Bauer et al. (2004) suggest that lacking man-
agerial discretion to manipulate earnings is respon-
sible for their observation that well-governed
companies report lower performance (ROE and
NPM) than poorly governed companies, but do not
provide evidence to support this suggestion. The
results of the above analyses conﬁrm that manager-
ial discretion is an important factor to consider
when examining the relationship between corporate
governance compliance and operating performance.
More speciﬁcally, the results of the analyses are
evidence: (1) that, in contrast to the ﬁnding of Bauer
et al. (2004), well-governed companies perform
better than poorly governed companies, once
examining performance measures which are less
prone to managerial discretion (ROA or ROS); and
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 05 ABR Bauwhede.3d Page 507 of 516
23 Consistent with the results of Bartov et al. (1993), the OLS
estimation results of a regression of the income from asset
disposals (scaled by sales) on: (1) the difference between the
ROS and the prior period NPM; and (2) ﬁrm leverage show a
signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on the performance difference.
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(2) that poorly governed companies exploit their
discretion to manage bottom line earnings upwards
to a level which is (relatively) similar to that of well-
governed companies.
Code law versus common-law countries
Various elements of the institutional infrastructure,
such as investor protection, differ between com-
mon-law and code-law countries. These differ-
ences were, in turn, found to be related to
differences in, for example, the size of the capital
markets (both equity and debt markets) (La Porta
et al., 1997), ownership concentration (La Porta et
al., 1998, and La Porta et al., 1999), information
provision (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1998,
Ball et al., 2000, Francis et al., 2003, Leuz et al.,
2003), and the demand for auditing (Francis et al.,
2003). I test whether the observed relation between
the extent of compliance with international best
practices regarding board structure and functioning
and operating performance is present in both types
of countries by estimating the operating perform-
ance model on the subsamples of the code-law and
common-law countries separately. The common-
law countries in the sample are the UK and
Ireland. The code-law countries are all other
countries in the sample. The results for the code-
law subsample (145 ﬁrm-year observations, 81
different companies) and common-law subsample
(56 ﬁrm-year observations, 37 different com-
panies) (not reported) are qualitatively similar to
the results reported in Table 3, i.e. I ﬁnd a positive,
albeit somewhat less signiﬁcant, relation between
the extent of compliance with international best
practices concerning board structure and function-
ing and the one-year ahead ROA.
5.4. Robustness checks
The robustness of the results is tested to model
speciﬁcation. I ﬁrst replace the 28 two-digit industry
dummies, which consume a lot of degrees of
freedom given the size of the sample, with dummies
for broader industry classes with at least 10 ﬁrms
per class. I formed the broader classes by using the
one-digit classiﬁcation and by redistributing the
observations from one-digit classes with less than
10 ﬁrms, i.e. mining, oil & gas (one-digit 0) and
information technology (one-digit 9) to the other
one-digit classes. The results of estimating these
new operating performance models (not reported)
are qualitatively similar to the results reported in
Table 3.
As an additional check, I replace the dependent
variables, i.e. the performance variables, with the
industry median adjusted values, and deleted the
two-digit industry dummies from the operating
performance model. The medians were computed
per broader industry class. Results (not reported) are
qualitatively similar to the results reported in
Table 3.
Next, I test whether the results are robust to
controlling for country-level performance differ-
ences by including country dummies in the original
operating performance model. I also estimate an
operating performance model with inclusion of
country dummies and replacement of the two-digit
industry dummies by dummies for broader industry
classes, and an operating performance model with
inclusion of country dummies, exclusion of two-
digit industry dummies and replacement of the
dependent variables with their industry median
adjusted values. The estimation results of all these
alternative operating performance models show that
the results on the test variable CG_COMPL (not
reported) are qualitatively similar to the results
reported in Table 3 for all three performance
measures.
In the primary analyses, I use one-year ahead
instead of contemporaneous performance meas-
ures in order to make sure that the governance
systems described by the ratings are in place and
operational at the moment that I start measuring
performance. To test whether the results depend
on this speciﬁcation, I reran the operating
performance model using contemporaneous per-
formance measures. The results on the test
variable are similar to the results reported in
Table 3.
To test whether the results are dependent on the
measure of ﬁrm size, I replace the natural logarithm
of total assets (LNTA) by the natural logarithm of
market capitalisation. I explore the impact of ﬁrm
history on the corporate governance–operating
performance relation by including in the regression
model ﬁrm age or book-to-market. The results on
the test variable are qualitatively similar to the
results reported in Table 3.
I further test whether the results for the operating
performance model are not biased by correlated
omitted corporate governance variables. If a vari-
able which is related to both performance and the
extent of compliance with international best prac-
tices concerning board structure and functioning is
omitted from the analyses, then this variable may
actually cause the observed relation between per-
formance and the extent of compliance with inter-
national best practices concerning board structure
and functioning, and we may wrongly conclude that
the extent of compliance with international best
practice regarding board structure and functioning
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 05 ABR Bauwhede.3d Page 508 of 516
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per se is related to ﬁrm performance. A correlation
matrix (not reported) shows that the extent of
compliance with best practices in various other
governance areas, such as rights and duties of
shareholders,24 range of takeover defences,25 and
disclosure on corporate governance26 are signiﬁ-
cantly and positively related to the ﬁrms’ compli-
ance with best practices concerning board structure
and functioning. Moreover, the results of estimating
(using OLS) the basic regressions in which the
variable board structure and functioning is replaced
sequentially by, ﬁrst, the Deminor rating of rights
and duties of shareholders, next, the rating of
takeover defences, and ﬁnally, the rating of disclo-
sure on corporate governance (see Table 5, Panel A)
show that the rating of the range of takeover
defences and the rating of disclosure on corporate
governance are signiﬁcantly correlated with the
ROA. Consequently, the question arises whether the
primary results suffer from correlated omitted
variables bias, for the other dimensions of govern-
ance are clearly linked to the test variable and the
dependent variable ROA, but not included in the
main analyses. To address this concern I expand the
operating performance model with the rating of
rights and duties of shareholders and the rating of
takeover defences, in addition to the rating of board
structure and functioning (i.e. the expanded oper-
ating performance model). I do not include the
rating of disclosure of corporate governance
because the correlation coefﬁcient between the
disclosure rating and the rating of board structure
and functioning is high (0.7927). This high correl-
ation does not only suggest that both ratings contain
very similar information, but also implies that the
results of a regression including both ratings suffer
from multicollinearity, which makes interpretation
of the coefﬁcient estimates difﬁcult. Table 5, Panel
B, reports the results of the expanded operating
performance model. These results closely parallel
the results from the primary operating performance
model as reported in Table 3, which suggests that
the primary results are not biased by correlated
omitted governance variables. More speciﬁcally,
the rating of board structure and functioning
remains positive and signiﬁcant in the ROA
model, while it remains insigniﬁcant in the ROE
and NPM models. The results on the other two
ratings, i.e. rights and duties of shareholder and
range of takeover defences, parallel the results of
the regressions in which each rating was included
separately as reported in Table 5, Panel A.
By excluding the rating of disclosure on corpor-
ate governance in the expanded operating perform-
ance model there is still a possibility that the results
in Table 3 and Table 5, Panel B are biased because
of correlated omitted variables. In order to further
address this concern, I also performed a principal
component factor analysis27 on the four different
ratings disclosed by Deminor, i.e. the rating of
board structure and functioning, the rating of rights
and duties of shareholders, the rating of takeover
defences and the rating of disclosure on corporate
governance. The solution is rotated using an
orthogonal VARIMAX rotation. This analysis
shows that the four ratings can be summarised in
two underlying factors. (All factors with an
eigenvalue greater than unity are retained.) As
expected, the rating of board structure and func-
tioning and the rating of disclosure on corporate
governance load on factor 1. This conﬁrms that both
ratings contain very similar information. The rating
of rights and duties of shareholders and the rating of
takeover defences load on factor 2. The corres-
ponding factors scores were computed (using the
regression method) and the two factors scores were
then introduced together in the basic regression
(i.e. Regression (2)) for CG_COMPL. Table 5,
Panel C, reports the results of these tests. As
concerns the one-year ahead ROA, the results show
that factor 1, but not factor 2, is positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated with this performance meas-
ure (p<0.01). As concerns the one-year ahead ROE
and the one-year ahead NPM, the results show that
neither factor 1 nor factor 2 are signiﬁcantly
correlated with these performance measures. The
results on the factor scores conﬁrm the results
reported in Table 3 and Table 5, Panels A and B.
In order to further investigate the overall impact
of ﬁrms’ governance structures, I estimate an
operating performance regression in which I replace
the rating of board structure and functioning by a
total rating (i.e. a total across the different govern-
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 05 ABR Bauwhede.3d Page 509 of 516
24 The rating of rights and duties of shareholders covers
indicators concerning the respect of the one-share one-vote one-
dividend principle, voting right restrictions, voting issues,
shareholder proposals and voting procedures (Deminor, 2001:
7).
25 The rating of range of takeover defences covers indicators
concerning the presence and strength of anti-takeover devices
such as poison pills, golden parachutes, core shareholdings,
extensive cross-shareholdings and co-option systems that could
be used to protect the company from a hostile takeover and to
disenfranchise shareholders (Deminor, 2001: 7).
26 The rating of disclosure on corporate governance covers
indicators regarding the quantity and quality of non-ﬁnancial
information, such as the diversity and independence of board
members, board committees, director remuneration, accounting
standards, information on major shareholders of the company,
and environmental information (Deminor, 2001: 7).
27 Results are qualitatively similar when using a principal
factor method.
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Table 5
Additional regression results#
Panel A: OLS coefﬁcient estimates (and t-statistics) on the different governance ratings, included each
one at a time
ROA ROE NPM
Board structure and functioning 0.0054*** –0.0034 –0.0023
(2.38) (–0.39) (–0.61)
Rights and duties of shareholders –0.0016 0.0224* 0.0086
(–0.55) (1.67) (1.42)
Range of takeover defences 0.0054** 0.0012 0.0007
(2.16) (0.16) (0.20)
Disclosure on corporate governance 0.0056** –0.0097 –0.0043
(2.27) (–1.18) (–1.09)
Panel B: OLS coefﬁcient estimates (and t-statistics) on ratings included together in one model
ROA ROE NPM
Board structure and functioning 0.0046** –0.0073 –0.0041
(2.27) (–0.80) (–0.98)
Rights and duties of shareholders –0.0066** 0.0280** 0.0107
(–2.04) (2.00) (1.56)
Range of takeover defences 0.0060** –0.0052 –0.0013
(2.20) (–0.64) (–0.30)
Other regressors Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 51.56% 25.54% 22.96%
N 201 201 201
Panel C: OLS coefﬁcient estimates (and t-statistic) for factor scores
ROA ROE NPM
Factor 1 0.0094*** –0.0178 –0.0082
(2.69) (–1.42) (–1.47)
Factor 2 0.0008 0.0238 0.0097
(0.25) (1.63) (1.58)
Other regressors Included Included Included
Adj. R-squared 49.82% 25.46% 23.33%
N 201 201 201
Panel D: OLS coefﬁcient estimates (and t-statistic) for overall governance rating
ROA ROE NPM
Total rating 0.0018** –0.0002 –0.0004
(2.03) (–0.06) (–0.29)
Adj. R-squared 49.12% 23.32% 21.99%
N 201 201 201
# This table reports the results of the OLS estimation of the following regression model:
Performanceit ¼ b0 þ b1CGCOMPLit þ b2LEVit þ b3LNTAit þ b4Y2001it þ b5Xit þ eit
Where: Performanceit = ROA, ROE or NPM. ROA = one-year ahead return on assets for ﬁrm i in year t,
and is measured as operating income divided by average total assets; ROE = one-year ahead return on
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ance dimensions) as disclosed by Deminor. The
estimation results for that model are included in
Table 5, Panel D. These results show that the total
rating is signiﬁcantly and positively related with the
one-year ahead ROA, but is not signiﬁcantly related
with the one-year ahead ROE nor with the one-year
ahead NPM.
Note that, notwithstanding that the performance
model was carefully constructed based on theory
and prior empirical evidence, and that the above
tests indicate that the results of our primary analysis
are robust to correlated omitted governance vari-
ables, one can never exclude that there exists an
unknown correlated factor which is omitted from
the analyses and actually causes the relationship
between performance and the extent of compliance
with international best practices concerning board
structure and functioning.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined the relation between the
extent of compliance with international best prac-
tices concerning board structure and functioning
and the operating performance of large listed
European companies. Although theory suggests
that greater compliance with international best
practices concerning board structure and function-
ing is positively related with operating perform-
ance, a prior European study (Bauer et al., 2004)
reports evidence of a negative association between
corporate governance compliance and corporate
performance. I have re-examined the relation
between corporate governance compliance and
operating performance in a setting where there
remained considerable diversity in the extent of
compliance with international best practices regard-
ing corporate governance. Consistent with expect-
ations, results of univariate and multivariate tests
show that greater compliance with international best
practices concerning board structure and function-
ing is signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with
the one-year ahead ROA. The results are robust to
controlling for ﬁrms’ compliance with best practices
in other governance areas, such as rights and duties
of shareholders and range of takeover defences, and
to controlling for country-level performance.
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Table 5
Additional regression results (continued)
equity for ﬁrm i in year t, and is measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by the average
book value of stockholders’ equity; NPM = one-year ahead net proﬁt margin for ﬁrm i in year t, and is
measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by sales revenues; CG_COMPLit = score from 1 to
5 with higher scores indicating greater compliance of ﬁrm i in year t with international best practice
concerning board structure and functioning; LEVit = ratio of short-term debt plus long-term debt over total
assets for ﬁrm i in year t; LNTAit = natural logarithm of total assets for ﬁrm i in year t; Y2001it = year
dummy, =1 when an observation is from 2001, zero otherwise; Xit = a vector of industry dummies based on
the FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System two-digit code for the industry sector.
Panel A reports the results on CG_COMPL in four different regressions. The four regressions differ in the
measure used for CG_COMPL. In the ﬁrst regression, CG_COMPL equals the Deminor rating of board
structure and functioning (cf. the model and the results reported in Table 3). In the second regression,
CG_COMPL is the Deminor rating of rights and duties of shareholders. In the third regression,
CG_COMPL is the Deminor rating of range of takeover defences. And in the fourth regression,
CG_COMPL is the Deminor rating of disclosure on corporate governance. Panel B reports the results on
CG_COMPL of a regression in which CG_COMPL is measured by including three separate Deminor
ratings (i.e. rating of board structure and functioning, rating of rights and duties of shareholders and the
rating of takeover defences) together in one regression. Panel C reports the results of a performance
regression in which CG_COMPL is replaced by two factor scores. These two factors scores are obtained
(using the regression method) from a principal component factor analysis (using an orthogonal VARIMAX
rotation) on the four sub-ratings disclosed by Deminor. The rating of board structure and functioning and the
rating of disclosure on corporate governance load on factor 1. The rating of rights and duties of shareholders
and the rating of takeover defences load on factor 2. Panel D reports the results on CG_COMPL in a
regression in which CG_COMPL is measured by the total governance rating as reported by Deminor. The
total governance rating summarises ﬁrms’ performance in the various governance dimensions covered by
Deminor.
*,** and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively and is based on a one-
tailed test if the sign of the coefﬁcient is in the predicted direction, and is based on a two-tailed test
otherwise. T-values are adjusted for within-company dependence by using clustered robust standard errors.
Results on the two-digit industry dummies are not reported for parsimony.
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Results of additional tests show that greater com-
pliance with international best practices in other
governance dimensions, namely disclosure of cor-
porate governance and range of takeover defences,
is signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the
one-year ahead ROA.
Further tests show that greater compliance with
international best practices concerning board struc-
ture and functioning is signiﬁcantly associated with
reporting less income from asset disposals and that
studying a performance measure that includes this
item, as Bauer et al. (2004) do, obscures the
inherently positive relationship between operating
performance and the extent of compliance with
international best practices regarding board struc-
ture and functioning. The measure of operating
performance is thus crucial when examining ﬁrm-
level operating performance.
Although the results show only correlation
between one-year ahead operating performance
and the extent of compliance with international
corporate governance best practices, and do not
prove causation, the results suggest that ﬁrms may
beneﬁt from complying with international corporate
governance best practices, which may help to
convince companies to adopt good governance
practices. In addition, the results of the investigation
may support regulators in motivating and defending
their corporate governance decisions, and may
prove useful for investors when assessing and
evaluating company performance. One has to bear
in mind, however, that not all individual governance
characteristics identiﬁed by the independent rating
agency as being best practices can unequivocally be
classiﬁed as such. Also, as with most other
governance studies, tests were performed on a set
of large listed non-ﬁnancial companies. Therefore,
the results do not necessarily hold in a sample of
smaller companies, privately-held companies, or
ﬁnancial companies. An examination of the impact
of governance on the operating performance of
smaller companies, privately-held companies, or
ﬁnancial companies is then also an interesting
avenue for future research.
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